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The German Federal Office of Defense Technology and 
Procurement has been analyzing the influence of 
networked sensors and effectors on military 
capabilities. The background of our overall scenario is 
peace support operations (PSO) in an urban 
environment. The background for the actual technical 
evaluations of sensors, effectors and the connecting 
network is the following scenario vignette: Convoy 
Protection. 
The forces at a sanctuary in the center of a city are 
supplied with fuel, ammunition and food transported 
by a convoy running from the headquarters, located at 
the airport. This convoy is protected by: 
• Two check points as flank protections 
• UAV, UGV 
• AWC (Wiesel) 
• LIV (Fuchs) 
Evaluation of the Ground Picture: The convoy 
leader is connected to the mission cell at his 
headquarters and as well to the leaders of the check 
point. He can react on information received from the 
UAV and UGV on possible trafficability of the pre 
planned route. Detours are possible. 
There is an asymmetric threat: A local burning 
obstacle brings the convoy to a stop. Mobile barriers in 
an ambush, snipers and bazooka shots are looking for 
an opportunity to intercept the convoy. 
The MOE's are: 
• the delivery time and 
• BLUE casualties. 
The technical effects of special sensors and 
effectors at the convoy and his NCO capability will be 
examined. The basic implementation of the scenario in 
MANA was the task during PAIW 12. The challenge of 
modelling was the level of detail. 
The simulation tool in IDFW 14 will be MANA, 
again, in spite of our realization of the limitation of the 
tool MANA in this scenario. The experiment design 
will follow the NOLH design and possibly a mixed 
NOLH/Grided Design.  The idea is to follow a three 
step approach: 
• Step 1: using existing equipment (sensors, 
effectors) 
• Step 2: using equipment under development 
(sensors, effectors) 
• Step 3: using future equipment (sensors, 
effectors). 
Variations will be investigated in the technical 
representation of UAV / UGV speeds, communication 
and sensors, in scenario details and in a variation of 
protection and equipment.
For the planned investigations three scenarios 
were prepared. Two of them differ in the distance 
between the vehicles. In one we took 50 meters and in 
the other we took 10 meters (which is more usual for 
the German Bundeswehr). These two scenarios have to 
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be assigned to the mentioned Step 2 because a UGV or 
a UAV are not introduced to the forces yet.
The third scenario belongs to Step 1.  Here we 
replaced the reconnaissance-devices by just the human 
eye. A vehicle of the escort drives up to the junction, 
checks the surrounding area and triggers the convoy 
depending on the observed.
Step 3 was partly covered by a corresponding 
choice of the intervals for the parameters in the DoE. 
Modifications of the scenarios due to step 3 could not 
be made because of the shortness of the workshop.
Figure 1
The first series of experiments was made in vain. 
We started with the DoE which we already used for 
IDFW13 in Scheveningen. There we intended to 
investigate the most important parameters of  the 
sensors, the convoy, the network and the irregular 
forces. We extended that design by the “concealment” 
attribute of the terrain, the “stealth factor” of the 
irregular forces and the “number of hits to kill” of the 
supply vehicles. The “concealment” attribute is an 
element of the unit interval [0,1]. OldMcData and/or 
the Tiller could not handle these values and rounded 
them to zero. So the experiments were conducted 
without concealment. That wasn’t our intention.
From the next series of experiments we learned the 
different distances between the convoy’s vehicles 
don’t have a significant influence on the MoE. You can 
observe this outcome for example in the following 
picture (Figure 1) where the distributions of the 
casualties of the first supply vehicle are compared. 
On the left-hand side we see the corresponding 
distribution of the 10m – scenario and on the right-
hand side the one of the 50m-scenario.  They are almost 
the same. The mean and the other empirical values are 
almost the same. Therefore we decided not to consider 
the 50m – scenario in the following experiments.
The tactics of the irregular forces were modeled 
the following way. They shoot at the vehicles when 
they see fit. The next picture (Figure 2) shows the 
street with the ambushing red forces.  The two soldiers 
at the lower and the upper end of the street are the 
bazooka shots. It is obvious that the modeled tactic is 
not an efficient tactic. Therefore we changed it. For the 
next experiments the red forces stay covered until the 
bazooka shot at the upper end of the street opens fire 
by shooting at the leading vehicle. Then the others will 
shoot when they see fit.
Figure 2
With the next pictures we will see the differences 
in the outcome of the experiments with the Step2-
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scenario. The following picture (Figure 3) shows the 
distributions of the casualties of the four supply 
vehicles with the old tactic of the red forces.
Figure 3
The next picture (Figure 4) will show us the 
consequence of the new tactics.
Figure 4
Especially the two distributions on each right-
hand side are very different.  The mean of the 
casualties of the first tanker rises from 5 % to 24 %!
Finally we will have a short look at the 
comparison between Step 1 and Step 2. The results as 
far as the fight is concerned will not be different 
because there are no differences in the modeling. The 
only difference that can be expected is the 
performance of the reconnaissance. 
The picture (Figure 5) shows the distributions of 
the casualties of the indicator agent for the original 
route. The means are the probabilities of detection. On 
the left side we see Step 1 with the probability of 
detection of 2%. On the right side the probability is 31 
%. That means quite an improvement.
Figure 5
Unfortunately it was not worth to go into deeper 
comparisons. We observed in the results that the 
scenarios especially the one of Step 2 didn’t work 
correctly. Almost one third of the results were wrong. 
We saw it by comparing the casualties of the leading 
vehicle and the number of arrivals at the mosque.
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